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MATHEMATICS AND THE ART OF STATECRAFT:
THE 1969 REAPPORTIONMENT CASES.
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler1 and its companion case, Wells v. Rockefeller,2
represent the final opinions of the Warren Court in the area of legislative
reapportionment. They would be of significance for that reason alone, for
it was that Court which first established judicial responsibility in this area.
The importance of these cases, however, is not merely historical. They as-
sert, for the first time, a precise standard by which reapportioning legisla-
tures are to be guided.
The involvement of the judiciary as a forum for legislative reapportion-
ment is of comparatively recent vintage. Until 1962, reapportionment was
found to be outside the scope of the judicial function.3 The rule of Colegrove
v. Green4 governed, holding that reapportionment was an issue for the
legislative branch, "of a peculiarly political nature and therefore not meet
for judicial determination." 5  The rationale was that "[ilt is hostile to a
democratic system to involve the judiciary in the politics of the people."
In 1962, however, the Supreme Court handed down its historic opinion in
Baker v. Carr7 and asserted a role for the judiciary in the field of reappor-
tionment.
In Baker, the Tennessee scheme for apportioning its state legislature was
attacked as violating the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protec-
tion of the laws. 8 The Tennessee legislature had not been reapportioned
since 1901, and later population shifts had resulted in underrepresentation
of urban areas. The lower federal court, following Colegrove, denied juris-
diction over the subject matter, and dismissed the action. The Supreme
Court reversed. Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority, determined
that the trial court had jurisdiction of the subject matter, that the appellants
had standing to sue, and more importantly, that the issue of reapportionment
was justiciable.
1 394 U.S. 526, rehearing denied, 395 U.S. 917 (1969).
2 394 U.S. 542 (1969).
3 An exception is Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), where the Supreme
Court reversed a dismissal of a suit for a declaratory judgment on the constitu-
tionality of a municipal boundary change in view of the requirements of the Fifteenth
Amendment.
4 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
G Id. at 552.
6 Id. at 553-54.
7 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
8 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 reads in part, "[nor] shall any State . . . deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
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The Supreme Court directed the lower court to hear the case on the
merits, thereby foreclosing the formulation at that time of any standard by
which state legislators would be guided in reapportioning in a constitutional
manner. It was Gray v. Sanders9 which first intimated the standards that
were to be set.
Gray was not a reapportionment case; it involved a challenge to the
Georgia county unit system'0 in primary elections. Justice Douglas, writing
for the majority of the Court, declared that the Georgia system violated the
voters' rights to equal protection of the laws, in that it "weights the rural
vote more heavily than the urban vote. . ."I' The Court held that equal
protection of the laws in the area of voter's rights "can mean only one thing-
one person, one vote."'
2
Justice Douglas reiterated that this was not a reapportionment case, and
that the Gray standard was not a reapportionment standard. Voting and
reapportionment, however, are closely related, and the adoption of the
Gray standard, or one similar, in the area of reapportionment, appeared
inevitable.
The Supreme Court set such a standard in Wesberry v. Sanders.'8 Wes-
berry involved a challenge to a Georgia system of congressional districting.
Justice Black held that the Georgia system was in violation of Article I, Sec-
tion 2 of the Constitution, which demands that the representatives be chosen
"by the People of the several States.' 1 4 The mandate of Article I, Section 2
was that "[w]hile it may not be possible [for the states] to draw congres-
sional districts with mathematical precision,"'u the Constitution requires
"that as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election
is to be worth as much as another's."' 6 The use of this provision rather
than the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 17 elicited
a persuasive dissent from Justice Harlan. He reasoned that if Article I,
9 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
10 Under the county unit system, each county is entitled to a specified number of
representatives in the state's assembly. The Georgia plan included the following pro-
visions: 1) The candidate who receives a plurality in the county gets two votes for
each representative to which the county is entitled; 2) a majority of the statewide
county unit vote nominates a governor or a U.S. Senator. A plurality is sufficient to
nominate all others. Id. at 370-71.
31 Id. at 379.
12 Id. at 381.
13 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
14 Id. at 7. The applicable paragraph of U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2 reads:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every
second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State
shall have [the] Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch
of the State Legislature.
15 376 U.S. at 18.
16 Id. at 7-8.
17 Justice Clark, concurring in Wesberry, would have based the opinion on the
Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 19.
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Section 2 leaves to the states the power to determine the qualifications to be
required of its voters,18 it would be illogical to claim that the very sentence
which allows states to disqualify voters also prevents states from apportion-
ing as they choose. 19
As Article I, Section 2 applied only to congressional elections, Wesberry's
use as precedent was effectively limited. No standards for directing the
apportionment of state legislatures had yet been developed. In 1964, in
Reynolds v. Sims,20 the Supreme Court set such a standard, and expanded
the Wesberry rule to apportionment of state legislatures.
In Reynolds, an Alabama scheme for the reapportionment of that State's
legislature was struck down as being in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment guarantee of equal protection of the laws. Chief Justice Warren, after
stressing population equality as the primary consideration in reapportion-
ment, fixed the standard by which future legislators were to be guided.
They were required to make a good faith effort to apportion both houses
as nearly as is practicable on an equal population basis.
21
The Wesberry and Reynolds standards were hardly definitional. Legisla-
tures had been given rough guidelines, but they still were faced with uncer-
tainty concerning the constitutionality of their plans. In the instant cases,
the Court was required to examine more incisively the standards it had
created, and to elucidate the "as nearly as is practicable" standard in a
specific factual setting. Several choices were available to the Court in this
definitional context. Each possible standard, however, could be developed
only upon the foundation of the goals reapportionment seeks to achieve.
It is not sufficient to suggest that the goal is "one person, one vote," for
that mandate is in itself a method which in turn is used to guarantee that all
persons will be equally able to express themselves through the legislatures.
22
Is Id. at 24. See note 14 supra for the applicable text of U.S. CoNsT. art. I,
§ 2.
19 376 U.S. at 25-26.
20 377 U.S. 533 (1964). There were five companion cases handed down with Rey-
nolds. They were, WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); Maryland Comm.
for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678
(1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Lucas v. 44th Gen. Assembly, 377
U.S. 713 (1964).
21 377 U.S. at 579-81. Chief Justice Warren made it clear that representa-
tion of special interests was subordinate to the individual's right of voting power:
"Citizens, not history or economic interest, cast votes." Id. at 580. The only non-
population element recognized as justifiable in state reapportionment schemes was the
existence of political subdivisions, on the ground that some decentralization of authority
within that state government was necessary and that local government must therefore
have a voice in the state legislature. Id. at 580-81.
22 It should be noted that "one person, one vote" is not limited to legislatures. It
applies as well to the election of county commissioners, Avery v. Midland County,
390 U.S. 474 (1968), and to the election of junior college trustees, Hadley v. Junior
College Dist., 90 S. Ct. 791 (1970).
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The basic goal of reapportionment, then, is to ensure the integrity of the
electorate's opportunity of expression. This statement of the goal, how-
ever, needs some refinement. What policies should be capable of expression?
What, if anything, should reapportionment legislation seek to prevent?
Justice Brandeis had suggested that the policies "which an informed, in-
telligent, just-minded, civilized man could rationally favor" 23 must be capa-
ble of expression. The effect of reapportionment, therefore, is not only to
preserve the means of effective expression and political power, but also to
"prevent a minority of the population or a minority party from consistently
controlling the state legislature or a congressional delegation, '24 and denying
to others the ability of expression when such expression conflicts with self-
interest. This has been a recurrent theme of the Warren Court:
Logically, in a society ostensibly grounded on representative government, it would
seem reasonable that a majority of the people of a State could elect a majority of
that State's legislators. To conclude differently, and to sanction minority control of
state legislative bodies, would appear to deny majority rights in a way that far
surpasses any possible denial of minority rights that might otherwise be thought
to result. Since legislatures are responsible for enacting laws by which all citizens
are to be governed, they should be bodies which are collectively responsive to the
popular will.25
Given this goal, what standards are available for its implementation?
It has been noted by Professor Israel that after Baker v. Carr,20 lower fed-
eral courts adopted three separate substantive approaches. The first was that
no variation from "practical" equality was acceptable; the second was that
deviations from absolute equality were acceptable upon justification; the
third was that state plans were acceptable if they were rational rather than
arbitrary.27
23 Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389, 406 (1928) (dissenting
opinion).
24 Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 555 (1969) (White, J., dissenting).
25 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
26 369 U.S. 186 (1962). As the Court in Baker did not reach the merits, the
lower federal courts were left for a short time to strike out on their own.
27 Israel, On Charting a Course Through the Mathematical Quagmire: The Future
of Baker v. Carr, 61 MICH. L. REv. 107 (1962).
Professor McCloskey has suggested in the context of state legislature reapportion-
ment that the primary analytical division in discussing standards is that of procedural
versus substantive considerations. McCloskey, Forward to The Supreme Court, 1961
Term, 76 HARv. L. REv. 54 (1962). The procedural considerations are those which
analyze whether the people of the state have had an adequate opportunity to, or in fact
did, manifest their will. Thus, if one legal avenue of public expression exists (e.g. a
popular referendum statute) reapportionment is unnecessary. The scheme in Baker
v. Carr would thus have been invalid not because the districts were unequal, but be-
cause, as Tennessee lacked such an avenue, public will could not have effectively, le-
gally been voiced. Under the substantive analysis, which MeCloskey disapproves and




The practical equality test, the strictest of the three in that the legislature
is given the least discretion, demands that each district contain approximately
the same number of voters. No considerations other than population are
acceptable, and justification of variances is considered irrelevant. When a
court applies this test it looks to the population figures of the reapportioned
districts, and on that basis alone determines whether the districts are practi-
cally equal. The test, although ostensibly objective, is subjective in effect
because it attempts to define "approximately". Set guidelines are incon-
sistent with this position; districts are either practically equal or they are not.
The variance justification test is less strict as it permits greater legislative
discretion. The basic premise is per capita equality, but deviations are
assumed. Consequently, the problem becomes one of analysis. In applying
this test, variances are examined in light of two distinct principles. The first
is the notion of de minimus. A court must decide whether some variances
are sufficiently minimal so as to be inherently permissible and therefore not
require explanation. Were a court to employ this concept, it must then de-
termine whether the variance in question falls within the de minimus area.
Two alternatives exist: a court could adopt a fixed de minimus (for ex-
ample, variances of less than five percent are permissible per se), or an "ab-
stract" de minimus (for example, variances in districts which are "approxi-
mately" equal would not have to be justified).
After having accepted or rejected the de minimus concept, a court would
still have to decide how to treat variances which were not de minimus. The
state would be called upon to justify such a variance. A court, then, must
decide what factors other than population may be constitutionally considered
by the state legislature, and determine whether its consideration in a given
fact situation justifies the variance which exists.
The third standard by which the conduct of legislatures could be governed
involves a determination of whether the policies by which the legislatures
were guided were rational rather than arbitrary. This, of course, gives
greatest latitude to legislative action. 28  A policy is not rational merely be-
cause its formulation was a result of much mental effort. A reasoned policy
could well be irrational, if rationality is defined as a policy which allows the
"fundamental values of our society" 29 to be represented. Obviously the
gerrymander, an extremely well reasoned policy, would, in constitutional
terms, be arbitrary rather than rational. Also, rationality does not depend
per se upon population. It would not be irrational, for example, to give
rural areas more representation than would result if population were the
28 One of the concepts underlying the rationality test is minimization of judicial
control over the state legislatures. It does little, however, to encourage legislators to
alter an ongoing legislative apportionment scheme in the interest of equal representa-
tion, in view of the fact that legislators would then be apportioning themselves out of
jobs.
29 Israel, supra note 27, at 138.
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primary consideration. They have peculiar economic needs, and the prob-
lem of access of rural voters to their representatives still lingers.30
The adoption of any of the above standards would adequately serve to
elucidate "as nearly as is practicable." The differences of opinion that
existed among Justices Brennan, Fortas, White, and Harlan in the instant
cases can be attributed to the choice of a standard, and the application of
that standard to the problems at hand.
Wells v. Rockefeller3l and Kirkpatrick v. Preisler32 had similar judicial
histories. In Wells, a three-judge District Court for the Southern District
of New York invalidated a congressional districting statute and retained
jurisdiction pending action by the state legislature.3 3  New York offered a
new plan, whereby seven sections of the state, making up thirty-one of the
state's forty-one districts were treated as homogeneous units and subdivided
into areas of equal population within the unit. The other ten districts were
created along multi-county lines. A variance of over twelve percent was
created: the population of the smallest district was 382,277, while that of
the largest was 435,880.34
The District Court sustained the constitutionality of the New York stat-
ute.35  On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed on the merits. Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, relied on the test established by Kirk-
patrick36 and determined that the Constitution "permits only the limited
population variances which are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to
achieve absolute equality, or for which justification is shown." 87 The Court
concluded that New York's plan of equalizing population only within "sub-
states" did not meet this requirement.33
In Kirkpatrick, a three-judge District Court for the Western District of
Missouri had twice struck down state plans for constructing congressional
districts and retained jurisdiction pending legislative correction.30 This, the
third plan, was the subject of controversy in the instant case.
30 The majority in Kirkpatrick, however, believed that because of advancements in
communication and transportation such a claim was "rather hollow". 394 U.S. 526,
535-36 (1969).
31 394 U.S. 542 (1969).
32 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
33 273 F. Supp. 984 (S.D.N.Y.), ajf'd mem., 389 U.S. 421 (1967).
34 Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 547-49 (1969).
35 Wells v. Rockefeller, 281 F. Supp. 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
36 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
37 Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 546 (1969), quoting Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,
394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969).
38 394 U.S. at 546. The Court also disapproved New York's argument that it
should be permissible to keep regions with distinct interests intact, and therefore denied
use of the plan in the next election and remanded to the trial court. Id. at 547.
39 Preisler v. Secretary of State, 257 F. Supp. 953 (W.D. Mo. 1966), af'd ner.
sub nom., Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 385 U.S. 450 (1967); Preisler v. Secretary of State,
238 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Mo. 1965).
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The plan in question left a variance of 5.97% between the largest and
smallest districts. The population of the largest district was 445,523, while
that of the smallest was 419,721. As the average population per district was
431,981, the variances ranged from 12,260 or 2.84% below to 13,542 or
3.13% above.
The District Court, observing that the plan was made in reliance on
data less accurate than available census figures, that the legislature had
rejected plans which would have resulted in smaller variances, and that the
mere switching of counties would have greatly reduced deviations, declared
the Missouri scheme invalid.40 Appeal was thereupon taken to the Supreme
Court.
The Supreme Court had previously decided, in Swann v. Adams, 41 that the
state must carry the burden of articulating "acceptable reasons for the
[population] variations .. .42 in its reapportionment plan. Accordingly,
Missouri presented two arguments. It claimed at the outset that the vari-
ance was so small as to be de minimus and thus did not require justification.
In the alternative, it attempted to justify the variance as resulting from con-
sideration of permissible factors. These factors were: 1) The necessity
of avoiding fragmentation of areas with distinct social or economic needs,
2) the political realities of the legislative forum, 3) the preservation of
existing political subdivisions, 4) adjustments for population shifts after the
most recent census, 5) adjustments for non-voters within the general popu-
lation, and 6) the desirability of geographical compactness. 43
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, rejected Missouri's arguments.
Relying upon the statement in Wesberry v. Sanders,44 that "equal representa-
tion for equal numbers of people [represents] the fundamental goal," 45 the
Court stated that the "as nearly as is practicable" standard requires that the
state make a good faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality. In-
herent in this concept was that the only permissible population variances
were those which were "unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve
absolute equality, or for which justification is shown."' 46 Missouri's plan
was found defective under this formulation.
Missouri urged that its redistricting was valid under the notion of de
minimus.47 Conceptually, de minimus rests upon the principle that com-
plete population equality is unobtainable, that variance is inevitable, and
therefore it is illogical to demand that all variations be justified. The diffi-
40 Preisler v. Secretary of State, 279 F. Supp. 952 (1967).
41 385 U.S. 440 (1967).
42 Id. at 443.
43 Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530 (1969).
44 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
45 Id. at 18.
46 Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969).
47 Id. at 530.
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culty with this use of de minimus is that it demands the fixation of a nu-
merical limit. The function of the judiciary in reapportionment is to direct
the legislatures, and the problem in Kirkpatrick was that the phrase "as
nearly as is practicable" gave the legislatures direction without definition. To
maintain that an abstract de minimus has a place in the definition of "as
nearly as is practicable" is to beg the question.
De minimus must be either fixed numerically, or discarded. Justice Bren-
nan discarded it. A primary consideration was the requirement that the
states "make a good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality." 48
A minimal variance could still be the product of a lesser effort on their part.
De minimus was therefore inconsistent with the requirement of good faith.
Also, the fixing of a numerical limit below which variances would be de
minimus would of necessity be arbitrary, and neither flexible nor necessarily
protective of the voting power of citizens of the state. Finally, the adop-
tion of a de minimus standard would encourage the legislature to strive for
that goal rather than for absolute equality, the constitutional epitome of re-
apportionment.4"
Having rejected the use of the de minimus concept, Justice Brennan ad-
dressed himself to the justifications advanced in explanation of the vari-
ance. As any variance must be justified, justifications fall into one of two
categories. They are either unacceptable per se, or they are potentially ac-
ceptable upon sufficient proof. Those considerations which fall into the
latter category will suffice to explain variances only if their use was consistent
with a good faith effort to achieve equality.
Missouri's consideration of the need to represent social and economic
interests fell into the former category. It was held to be antithetical to the
basic premise of the constitutional command to provide "equal representa-
tion for equal numbers of people. .. .
If the goal were defined as equality of representation so as to ensure
majority rule, however, it has been convincingly argued that allowance must
be made for pressing, minority views. 51 This concept, at least as it concerns
the rural minority, is out of favor. MacDougall v. Green, 2 held that:
It would be strange indeed, and doctrinaire, for this Court. . . to deny a State the
power to assure a proper diffusion of political initiative as between its thinly popu-
lated counties and those having concentrated masses, in view of the fact that the
latter have practical opportunities for exerting their political weight . . not
available to the former.
5 3
48 Id. at 530-31.
49 See id. One Missouri legislator in fact suggested that the legislature attempt to
achieve a 2% variance. Id. at 531.
50 Id. at 530, quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964).
51 King, The Reynolds Standard and Local Reapportionment, 15 Busq. L. Rav.
120, 141 (1965).
52 335 U.S. 281 (1948). The issue in MacDougall was not one of reapportion-
ment, but of nomination requirements in national elections. See note 54, infra.
53 335 U.S. at 284.
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But MacDougall has been recently overruled by Moore v. Ogilvie.
54
The holding of Kirkpatrick, however, should not be read as antagonistic
to pressing social needs. Rather, the case maintains that social needs are
best represented, considering the alternatives, by adherence to the letter and
spirit of "one person, one vote." Thus there is nothing in the decision in-
consistent with the statement in Holt v. Richardson55 that,
[The] community of interests, community of problems, socio-economic status,
political and racial factors--each and all must be considered, and . . .the sum
total of all of the districting must result in substantial equality of meaningful
representation to each and all of the voters of the State.58
This statement embodies the essential goal of reapportionment. It assumes
that there are local interests and local problems (would there be a need to
discuss reapportionment otherwise?), and yet realizes that these interests and
problems can be expressed only through the voters. The corollary, then,
is that all voters should have a substantially equal opportunity to express
themselves, and that the majority will cannot be subordinated by overrepre-
sentation afforded to a minority.
The justification of legislative practicality was also rejected out of hand,
on the ground that "the rule is one of 'practicability' rather than political
'practicality'." 5 7  It cannot be denied that reapportionment is primarily a
legislative matter,58 and it has been suggested that legislative compromise
and interplay should therefore serve to justify some variance.5 9 If, how-
ever, the function of the judiciary is to secure equal voting power for equal
numbers of people, the essence of reapportionment is the protection of the
individual's specific constitutional rights, not the resolution of the problems
caused by partisan politics.
54 394 U.S. 814 (1969). MacDougall and Moore dealt with Illinois' requirement
that one prerequisite for listing of independents or of new party candidates on the bal-
lot was the obtaining of at least 200 signatures in at least 50 of the state's 102 counties.
The Court equated the problem of nomination requirements with that of reapportion-
ment in that, in either case, abridgement of the right to vote violates the constitu-
tional guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
55 240 F. Supp. 724 (D. Hawaii 1965).
50 Id. at 730. Holt was vacated by Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966), on
other grounds. Hawaii's reapportionment plan had included multi-member districts.
After the District Court had disapproved of the plan (it was of the opinion that at
least one house of the state legislature should be composed of single-member dis-
tricts), the Supreme Court remanded, holding that multi-member districts per se do not
violate the Equal Protection Clause.
57 Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 533 (1969), quoting the District Court
opinion, Preisler v. Secretary of State, 279 F. Supp. 952, 989 (N.D. Mo. 1967). The Dis-
trict Court felt that practicable was synonymous with feasible. Political practicality is
something else entirely, for it emphasizes the interworking of legislators which aids
the passage of legislative enactments. That which is feasible is not necessarily
politically practical.
58 Notes-Reapportionment, 79 HARV. L. Rnv. 1228, 1267 (1966).
SO The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HAv. L. Rv. 97, 102 (1969).
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Justice Brennan further rejected Missouri's claim that some variance was
permissible to maintain political subdivisions, on the same ground, that the
problems of practical politics, of which this was a variant, will not serve to
justify population deviations. Allowance for political subdivisions had been
an acceptable justification in Reynolds v. Sims.:0 Reynolds, however, had
involved the reapportionment of a state legislature. It was argued there that
consideration of political subdivisions was allowable because state govern-
ments require that some of their functions be performed locally, and also,
that preservation of local governmental units was necessary if the legislatures
were to be responsive to local needs.
The argument loses its efficacy when, as here, a congressional apportion-
ment is being challenged. Obviously, both national and state functions are
performed at a local level. Difference lies in that state functions are per-
formed by local government units while national functions are performed
within, yet without relation to, local governmental units. The inference can
be drawn from Reynolds that there exists reciprocity between state legisla-
tures and local units.0 1 This interaction is seemingly absent between Con-
gress and local units. Since local units derive their authority from the State,
they are not characterized by any reciprocity with Congress. If it could be
argued that the federal government does delegate authority to local units,
such a delegation would be, at most, sporadic.
Although Reynolds is distinguishable, political subdivisions could still
assert that if their voice is worthy of preservation in the state legislature, it
is doubly important to maintain representation in Congress, given the con-
tinuing expansion of that body's domain. It should be recalled, however,
that allowance for political subdivisions is an exception to the population
equality rule. Something more than expediency must exist before the ex-
ception can be made. In reapportionment of state legislatures, maintenance
of political subdivisions is necessary because of the state government's dele-
gation of authority to the local unit. Maintenance of political subdivisions
in congressional reapportionment is, at the most, expedient.
The implication is that there are different standards for the reapportion-
ment of congressional and of state legislative districts. If reapportionment
protects the same rights of the individual in each case, the result is a seeming
inconsistency. It is readily recognized, however, that there can be no ab-
solutes in the area of reapportionment. In state legislatures the rights of the
individual must be balanced against the need for a state legislature which is
responsive to local governmental units to whom it has delegated authority.
There is no need for such a balancing when the disputed plan involves re-
apportionment of congressional districts. No interplay exists between that
legislature and local units.
60 377 U.S. 533, 580 (1964).
61 Id. at 580-81. -
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Another consideration offered by Missouri and rejected by the majority
was the need for geographical compactness. The Court determined that
the existence of this justification was largely historical, and that there was
little merit to the claim that sparsely settled areas contributed to a lack
of access to representatives, given the rapid advances in communication
technology. 62  Professor McKay's analysis of the geographical justification
appears consistent with this rationale:
If the right protected by the [equal protection] clause is the right of individuals, as
is assuredly the case, it seems not permissible to measure-and restrict-the right
of franchise in terms of factors not related to the individual .... Geography as
such does not merit protection from outlawry by the equal protection clause.0 3
Professor McKay's argument, however, is tempered by that of Professor
Lucas:
The design of representation schemes obviously reflects a compromise between
notions of majority rule on the one hand, and representation of a variety of points
of view on the other, and where the geographical districts which serve as the basis
for interest representation were designed as a secondary device, never intended to
represent mere acreage or mere population, it should be obvious that their ration-
ality cannot be measured either in hides or in heads.
64
To demonstrate this position, Professor Lucas created a mythical 110 man
state, where there were ten districts, each with eleven voters. Conse-
quently, having six votes in each of six districts would enable a minority
party of thirty-six to effectively control the legislature. Sixty votes, there-
fore, could result in entire domination, notwithstanding exact population
equality. One possible effect of the use of geographic compactness is to
eliminate the gerrymander. Regular shaped districts would curtail political
districting adjustments designed to achieve these inappropriate ends. 65
Geographical compactness, as has been illustrated, could play an important
role in reapportionment. Absolute population equality, without more, does
not prevent gerrymandering. It is pointless to suggest that equal opportunity
for each voter to make his interests known is enough. One of the goals of
reapportionment is to avoid the subordination of the majority will by the
minority. There must, therefore, be some check on the gerrymander which
pure population equality does not provide. Allowing legislatures to con-
sider geographic compactness appears a simple solution to the gerrymander.
It allows the legislature to provide effective representation and yet opens
"no avenue for subterfuge." 6
62 394 U.S. at 535-36.
68 McKay, Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and Equal Pro-
tection, 61 MIcH. L. Rnv. 645, 696 (1963).
64 Lucas, Legislative Apportionment and Representative Government: The Meaning
of Baker v. Carr, 61 MicH. L. Rlv. 711, 766 (1963).
O5 Id. at 767.
66 See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 535 (1969). A legislature which plead
geographical compactness without attempting to achieve it would be soon discovered.
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The Court gave summary consideration to these contentions, stating that
"[a] State's preference for pleasingly shaped districts can hardly justify popu-
lation variances."167 It is questionable whether this is a sufficient basis to
deny Missouri the opportunity to justify a portion of the deviation by a show-
ig that geographical compactness was considered when the reapportionment
plan was devised.
Missouri's two other arguments, that allowances were made both for non-
voters and for shifts in population, were rejected, not because they were un-
acceptable themselves, but because Missouri's conduct did not evidence a
good faith effort to apply them. Justice Brennan stated that "Missouri
made no attempt to ascertain the number of eligible voters in each district
and to apportion accordingly. At best it made haphazard adjustments to a
scheme based on total population. .... 68
Since Missouri had failed to justify the variances which existed in its re-
apportionment plan, the District Court's finding that the Missouri plan was
unconstitutional was affirmed.
Justice Fortas concurred. He believed that the Court's opinion on its
face had placed far too stringent a requirement on state legislators, and that
the good faith requirement should be considered met if the state plan was
"based upon some orderly and objective method." 69 He then proceeded to
attack the Court's application of the variance justification test:
The Court ... also requires that any remaining population disparities 'no
matter how small,' be justified. It then proceeds to reject, seriatim, every type of
justification that has been-possibly, every one that could be-advanced.7O
Justice Fortas's position is curious. He does not believe that minor vari-
ances should have to be justified, on the one hand, 71 and agrees with the ma-
jority's rejection of the numerical de minimus principle on the other.72 Al-
though he does not object to the majority's choice of the variance justification
standard, Justice Fortas does disagree with its application. His position ap-
pears to be that there should be an "abstract" de minimus, and that vari-
ances which exceed it would have to be justified. He nevertheless concurred
in the majority opinion, as under either test Missouri's failure to make a
good faith effort rendered the plan unconstitutional.
There is no apparent reason to suppose that were geographical compactness a per-
missible justifiction, abuse of discretion would result.
67 Id. at 536.
08 Id. at 534-35.
69 Id. at 537. Justice Fortas wrote separate concurring opinions in Kirkpatrick
and in Wells. In Wells, he agreed that New York had failed to show a good
faith effort to achieve mathematical equality, but did not join the majority for the
reasons stated in his Kirkpatrick opinion. Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 549
(1969).
70 Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 537 (1969).
T1 Id. at 538.
72 Id. Justice Fortas' position, although it resembles the practical equality standard,
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A preference for an "abstract" de minimus is unfortunate for two reasons.
First, it adds nothing to the "as nearly as is practicable" doctrine. In terms
of guiding the legislatures, it would leave them in exactly the same position
they were in before Kirkpatrick was litigated. Second, it has no practical
effect. A legislature would have no way of knowing whether the variances
produced by a reapportionment plan were in fact de minimus. It would
still be forced to justify all variances in court.
Justice White, dissenting, agreed that the majority's test was too rigid.
He argued, instead, that a numerical de minimus standard should be estab-
lished, and that the rejection by the majority of certain of Missouri's justifica-
tions was inappropriate.
Justice White suggested that a population variance figure of no more than
ten to fifteen per cent between the largest and smallest districts should be
established, and that if a state plan created a lesser variance, justification
should not be required in the absence of unusual circumstances.
73 The
rationale was that,
This would be far more reasonable than the Court's demand for an absolute but
illusory equality or for an apportionment plan which approaches this goal so
nearly that no other plan can be suggested which would come nearer.
7 4
Such an argument would weigh effectively against the majority's holding
that a fixed de minimus is not only arbitrary but also contrary to the good
faith requirement if the demands the Court has made on the state legisla-
tures are in fact as rigid as Justice White claims. All that the majority has
done, however, is require that a state legislature make a good faith attempt
to create districts of equal population, and defend resulting variances by
showing that it took into account only permissible factors.
This is not an unduly strict requirement. A state legislature is not expected
to achieve absolute equality, although it is expected to try to achieve it.
The Court recognizes that some variances will be unavoidable. In addition,
it provides that larger variances can be justified by consideration of permissi-
ble factors. The Court does not require a superhuman effort; rather, it
asks merely for good faith. Population variances which are unavoidable
despite this good faith effort are explicitly allowed.
75
The plan has the advantage of conducing to greater certainty. If a legis-
lature knows what is required, even if the requirements are strict, the test
is not unduly difficult to implement, assuming, of course, that a legislature
does have the capacity to comply. The majority's standard is not beyond
is inconsistent with that standard. He would not subscribe to a standard which, in
theory, placed a greater burden upon state legislatures than does the standard adopted
by the majority (by refusing to allow justification of the variance).
73 Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 553 (1969). Justice White's dissenting
opinion in Wells applied to both cases.
74 Id. at 553-54.
75 Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1969).
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such compliance.
Justice White also disagreed with the majority's disposition of certain of
Missouri's variance justifications. Missouri had attempted to show that the
preservation of political subdivisions and geographical compactness had been
validly considered. He was disturbed that the majority discarded the
Reynolds suggestion that state legislatures should be allowed to consider
political subdivisions76 without making an attempt to distinguish Reynolds.77
Mr. Justice White argued that these factors were not only permissible, but
were in fact desirable as a defense against the gerrymander.
The rationale of this position is that the norms inherent in established
boundaries will deter a legislature inclined to gerrymander. This presumes
that set lines will have effective force. This, in itself, is questionable. When
the intent and opportunity to gerrymander arise, it is doubtful that a legis-
lature would in fact constrict redistricting within existing political subdivi-
sions. Further, it should be noted that the existing subdivisions may also be
the result of a previous gerrymander. Regardless of the strength of this
position, however, the argument arises in a strange context. Were Justice
White's contention valid, the state legislature, the only political organ which
could gerrymander, asks the Court to prevent it from doing so. The ma-
jority, on the other hand, essays to preserve the equality of one person, one
vote, by allegedly facilitating the gerrymander.
Justice White's observations would have merit if addressed to the issue of
geographical compactness. It is necessary to make a distinction between
undesirable motive and desirable effect. The state legislature would certain-
ly contend that geographical compactness should be a justification because it
would facilitate the formulation of its reapportionment plan. In order to
maintain geographical compactness, however, the legislature would have to
utilize it. Failure to do so would be evident on the face of the map. The
effect of the legislature's attempt to obtain latitude would be to stifle the
gerrymander.
Justice White further objected to the majority opinion as representing
an unnecessary involvement of the judiciary in the legislative task. He
characterized the Court as,
groping for a clean-cut, per se rule which will minimize confrontations between
courts and legislatures while also satisfying the Fourteenth Amendment. If so,
the Court is wide of the mark. Today's result simply shifts the area of dispute
a few percentage points down the scale. . . .78
This view is analogous to the dissent of Justice Harlan.
Justice Harlan found'the majority's holding to be an irrational extension of
what he considered to be an irrational doctrine, the rule of Wesberry v.
76 377 U.S. 533, 580 (1964).
77 As has been discussed, Reynolds is nevertheless distinguishable.
78 Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. at 555.
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Sanders.70 His dissatisfaction stemmed from the majority's "all-pervasive
distrust of the legislative process [which] is completely alien to established
notions of judicial review."80  Agreeing with Justice White, he went on to
state that "the rule of absolute equality is perfectly compatible with 'gerry-
mandering' of the worst sort."81
Justice Harlan objects to what appears to be the judiciary's self-asserted
domination over the state legislatures.82  The crux of the problem between
the judiciary and the legislatures in the area of reapportionment, however,
is not one of judicial overkill, but of direction. The judiciary has a duty to
invalidate state reapportionment plans which are unconstitutional. It has
a correlative duty to define as clearly as possible what the ingredients of a
constitutional reapportionment plan are. The judiciary has failed to perform
its function when it gives the state legislatures inadequate guidelines. Sepa-
ration of powers arguments do not eradicate such a failure.
Justice Harlan's comments on the nature of the subordination of the legis-
latures imply an appropriate criticism on the placement of the burden of
proof. Swann v. Adams83 established the principle that the state carried the
burden of justifying its plan. Justice Harlan dissented in Swann:
This holding seems to me to stand on its head the usual rule governing this
Court's approach to the validity of legislative enactments, state as well as federal,
which is, of course, that they come to us with a strong presumption of regularity
and constitutionality.
8 4
When a state is required not only to defend its plan, but also to prove that
it acted in good faith, the question is no longer simply one of who can most
conveniently come forward with evidence. Such a requirement presumes,
in effect if not in fact, that state legislators do not act in good faith. That is
a presumption which is contrary to the very basis of representative govern-
ment. It should not be indulged in lightly or across the board.'
Implicit in Justice Harlan's argument in Swann, and in his dissent
in the present cases, is the fear that the Court no longer considers the state
legislators morally capable of acting in good faith. Hopefully, Justice Har-
lan is mistaken, and the Court harbors no such sentiments. In that case, a
presumption that state legislators do not act in good faith has no place in the
reapportionment standard. If, on the other hand, Justice Harlan is correct,
either the Court is mistaken, in which case there is no need for the pre-
70 376 U.S. 1 (1964). Justice Harlan felt that he was bound by the Wesberry
rule, but that both the New York and Missouri plans were well within the "as nearly
as is practicable" requirements of that rule. 394 U.S. at 552.
80 394 U.S. at 550. Justice Harlan's dissent in Wells was applicable to both cases.
5' Id. at 551.
82 Id. at 550. This is not a new theme for Justice Harlan. See, e.g., his dis-
sents in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S.
1, 20 (1964); and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 330 (1962).
83 385 U.S. 440 (1967).
84 Id. at 447.
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sumption, or the legislatures are in fact morally incapable. If the latter is the
case, the definition of a reapportionment standard is futile, for the fault lies
in the choice of a system of representative government.
The question here, however, is whether this logic consistently culminates
in Justice Harlan's later statement that "the question before us is whether
the Constitution requires that mathematics be a substitute for common sense
in the art of statecraft.""8  Aside from the issue of the presumption, if a
deprivation of equality of representation, of which gerrymandering is only
one technique, is to result, it will in the great majority of instances be at the
hands of these legislatures.
It must be remembered that in the area of reapportionment "the cure is
often worse than the disease." Given that a congressional election is never
more than two years away, what can be done when a reapportionment scheme
is struck down? If the state legislators cannot repair the damage in time,80
what are the courts to do?
Former Solicitor-General Cox has noted that there are four remedies
open to the courts: they can order at-large elections; they can enjoin the
conduct of the election; they can apportion the districts themselves; or they
can reweight the votes of the various legislators without changing the bound-
aries of the districts.87
All of these remedies are subject to criticism. At-large elections would
effectively destroy any guarantee that local interests would be fully repre-
sented. The essence of reapportionment is the guarantee that manifestation
of interests will be population based. Here, local interests entitled to pro-
portional representation would find that a bare majority, consistent with
Professor Lucas' hypothetical previously given, might control every seat.
Secondly, any injunction against the election itself serves to maintain the
status quo, and thus perpetuate an adjudged invalid system. It could also
lessen the responsiveness of the legislators to their constituents.
The third possibility is reapportionment of the districts by the judiciary
itself. This could create serious separation of powers problems. Reappor-
tionment is still primarily a legislative function; yet this remedy interposes
a conflicting, co-equal branch of government. Finally, the court could re-
weight the votes of various legislators without changing the boundaries of
the districts. This would not guarantee that local interests in populous areas
would be represented. One man with two votes in the legislature could not
respond to or even discover the needs of his large constituency as well as
two legislators with one vote each. In addition, the practical problems
85 Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 552 (1969).
86 The instant case marks Missouri's third consecutive failure. See Preisler v. Sec-
retary of State, 257 F. Supp. 953 (W.D. Mo. 1966), aff'd mem. sub nom. Kirkpatrick v.
Preisler, 385 U.S. 450 (1967); Preisler v. Secretary of State, 238 F. Supp. 187 (W.D.
Mo. 1965).
87 Cox, Current Constitutional Issues, 48 A.B.A.J. 711, 713 (1962).
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which would arise within the legislative process could seriously hamper the
effectiveness of the legislature.8
No court will be forced to use one of these remedies until it finds itself
in a situation where the use of the remedy is preferable to leaving a reappor-
tionment scheme as it is while directing the legislature to repair it, or until
the legislature manifests an unwillingness to repair it. The need to use any
of these remedies will be avoided by a court created reapportionment stand-
ard which tells the legislature in clear terms exactly what is expected of
them. Uncertainty, since Baker v. Carr,8 9 has led to unconstitutional re-
apportionment, and it is unconstitutional reapportionment which creates the
need for the remedies. Their harsh nature lends strength to Justice Bren-
nan's majority opinions.
The court in the instant cases addressed itself to the problem of lending
substance to the "as nearly as is practicable" standard of "one person, one
vote." The result was a principle that variances beyond those unavoidable
despite a good faith effort to achieve absolute mathematical equality must
be constitutionally justified. This is not a perfect test. It may well be that
numerical equality alone will not guarantee equality of representation. But
the Court has at least provided a guideline which more closely approaches
precision than any of the preceding reapportionment standards albeit a
subjective good faith requirement remains. The problems of uncertainty
which confronted New York and Missouri and culminated in the Supreme
Court decisions appear solved. No longer can states complain of working in
a vacuum. Further, it does not seem difficult for state legislatures to meet
the demands of Wells and Kirkpatrick. The Court has not imposed re-
quirements which are realistically unattainable.
Steven W. Brown
88 Id.
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